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1. Introduction
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused the interest of
economists. For analyses of relative profit maximization see Schaffer (1989), Vega-Redondo
(1997), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu (2011),
Satoh and Tanaka (2013), (2014), Tanaka (2013a) and (2013b).
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In Vega-Redondo (1997) it was shown that the equilibrium in oligopoly with a homogeneous
good under relative profit maximization is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium. With dif-
ferentiated goods, however, the equilibrium in duopoly under relative profit maximization is not
equivalent to the competitive equilibrium.
In Tanaka (2013a) it was shown that under the assumption of linear demand and cost func-
tions when firms in duopoly with differentiated goods maximize their relative profits, the Cournot
equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium are equivalent. Satoh and Tanaka (2014) extended this
result to asymmetric duopoly in which firms have different cost functions. Satoh and Tanaka
(2013) showed that in a Bertrand duopoly with a homogeneous good under relative profit maxi-
mization and quadratic cost functions there exists a range of the equilibrium price, and that range
is narrower and lower than the range of the equilibrium price in duopolistic equilibria under
absolute profit maximization shown by Dastidar (1995). Tanaka (2013b) showed that under rel-
ative profit maximization the choice of strategic variables, price or quantity, is irrelevant to the
equilibrium of duopoly with differentiated goods.
In these papers the relative profit of a firm in duopoly is defined as the difference between its
profit and the profit of the rival firm. But we can alternatively define the relative profit as the ratio
of the profit of one firm to the total profit of two firms. In this paper we compare two formulations
of relative profit maximization in duopoly, 1) (Difference case) maximization of the difference
between the profit of one firm and that of the other firm, 2) (Ratio case) maximization of the ratio
of the profit of one firm to the total profit of two firms, under linear demand and cost functions.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the nature of human. Even if a
person earns a big money, if his brother/sister or close friend earns a bigger money than him, he
is not sufficiently happy and may be disappointed. On the other hand, even if he is very poor, if
his neighbor is more poor, he may be consoled by that fact.
Also firms in an industry not only seek their own performances but also want to outperform
the rival firms. TV audience-rating race and market-share competition by breweries, automo-
bile manufacturers, convenience store chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in Japan, are
examples of such behavior of firms.
Market-share competition of firms in many industries indicates that the definition of relative
profit based on the ratio may be more appropriate.
We show that in symmetric duopoly these definitions of relative profit are completely equiv-
alent, but in asymmetric duopoly the equilibrium output of the more efficient (lower cost) firm
in the ratio case is larger than that in the difference case, the equilibrium price of its good in the
ratio case is lower than that in the difference case, the equilibrium output of the less efficient
(higher cost) firm in the ratio case is smaller than that in the difference case, and the equilibrium
price of its good in the ratio case is higher than that in the difference case. Also we show that the
equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria holds in the ratio case as well as in the difference
case, and show that the total output in the ratio case is larger than that in the difference case.
In the next section we present the model of this paper, in Section 3 we analyze the difference
case, in Section 4 we consider the ratio case, and in Section 5 we present some discussions about
the results. A game of relative profit maximization in duopoly in the difference case is a zero-sum
game. The game in the ratio case is a constant-sum game. It is equivalent to a zero-sum game.
We present an interpretation of our result, in particular, the equivalence of Cournot and Bertrand
equilibria from the point of view of zero-sum game theory.
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2. The model
There are two firms, A and B. They produce differentiated substitutable goods. The outputs of
Firm A and Firm B are denoted by xA and xB . The prices of the goods of Firm A and B are
denoted by pA and pB .
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the firms are
pA D a   xA   bxB ;
and
pB D a   xB   bxA;
where 0 < b < 1. xA represents the demand for the good of Firm A, and xB represents the
demand for the good of Firm B. The prices of the goods are determined so that demand of con-
sumers for each firm’s good and supply of each firm are equilibrated.
The ordinary demand functions are obtained from these inverse demand functions as follows,
xA D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pA C bpB ;
and
xB D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pB C bpA:
Demand and inverse demand functions are symmetric for the firms.
The marginal costs of Firm A and B are denoted by cA and cB . In symmetric duopoly the
firms have the same marginal cost, that is, cA D cB . On the other hand, in asymmetric duopoly
cA ¤ cB . Without loss of generality we assume cA < cB in the asymmetric duopoly, that
is, Firm A is more efficient than Firm B. There is no fixed cost. cA and cB are positive, and
a > maxfcA; cBg.
In the Cournot model the absolute profits of Firm A and B are written as
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA;
and
B D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB :
Denote the relative profits of Firm A and B, when the relative profit of each firm is defined as
the difference between its profit and the profit of the rival firm, byA andB . Then, we have
A D A   B D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA   .a   xB   bxA/xB C cBxB ;
and
B D B   A D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB   .a   xA   bxB/xA C cAxA:
Denote the relative profits of Firm A and B, when the relative profit of each firm is defined as
the ratio of its profit to the total profit, by A and B . Then, we have
A D A
A C B D
.a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA
.a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA C .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB ;
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and
B D B
A C B D
.a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB
.a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA C .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB :
We call the former the difference case and the latter the ratio case.
In the Bertrand model the absolute profits of Firm A and B are written as
A D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/;
and
B D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/:
The relative profits of the firms in the difference case are
A D A   B
D 1
1   b2 f.1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/   .1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/g;
and
B D B   A
D 1
1   b2 f.1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/   .1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/g:
The relative profits of the firms in the ratio case are
A D A
A C B
D .1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/
.1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/C .1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/ ;
and
B D B
A C B
D .1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/
.1   b/a   pA C bpB .pA   cA/C .1   b/a   pB C bpA.pB   cB/ :
3. Difference case
We consider the difference case of asymmetric duopoly1. In the Cournot duopoly the first order
conditions for maximization of relative profits of the firms are
@A
@xA
D @A
@xA
  @B
@xA
D a   2xA   bxB   cA C bxB
D a   2xA   cA D 0; (1)
1The result in this section has been proved in Satoh and Tanaka (2014). But for comparison with the ratio case we
recapitulate the analysis in the difference case.
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and
@B
@xB
D @B
@xB
  @A
@xB
D a   2xB   bxA   cB C bxA
D a   2xB   cB D 0: (2)
The second order conditions
@2A
@x2A
D  2 < 0; and @
2B
@x2B
D  2 < 0
are satisfied.
The equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are obtained, respectively, as
Qxd;CA D
a   cA
2
;
and
Qxd;CB D
a   cB
2
:
d denotes difference, and C denotes Cournot. The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A
and B are obtained, respectively, as follows.
Qpd;CA D
.1   b/aC cA C bcB
2
;
and
Qpd;CB D
.1   b/aC cB C bcA
2
:
In the Bertrand duopoly the first order conditions for maximization of the relative profits of
the firms are
@A
@pA
D @A
@pA
  @B
@pA
D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2pA C bpB C cA   bpB C bcB 
D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2pA C cA C bcB  D 0; (3)
and
@B
@pB
D @B
@pB
  @A
@pB
D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2pB C bpA C cB   bpA C bcA
D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   2pB C cB C bcA D 0: (4)
The second order conditions
@2A
@p2A
D   2
1   b2 < 0; and
@2B
@p2B
D   2
1   b2 < 0
are satisfied.
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The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B are obtained, respectively, as follows.
Qpd;BA D
.1   b/aC cA C bcB
2
;
and
Qpd;BB D
.1   b/aC cB C bcA
2
:
B denotes Bertrand. The equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are
Qxd;BA D
a   cA
2
;
and
Qxd;BA D
a   cB
2
:
We have
Qxd;CA D Qxd;BA ; Qxd;CB D Qxd;BB ; Qpd;CA D Qpd;BA and Qpd;CB D Qpd;BB :
Thus, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the difference case the Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium are
equivalent.
The equilibrium absolute profits of the firms are
A D .a   cA/
2
4
  b.a   cA/.a   cB/
4
;
and
B D .a   cB/
2
4
  b.a   cA/.a   cB/
4
:
Comparing them yields
A   B D .2a   cA   cB/.cB   cA/
4
> 0:
Denote Qxd;CA and Qxd;BA by QxdA, Qxd;CB and Qxd;BB by QxdB , Qpd;CA and Qpd;BA by QpdA, Qpd;CB and Qpd;BB
by QpdB .
4. Ratio case
Next we consider the ratio case of asymmetric duopoly. The relative profits of Firm A and B in
the ratio case are denoted by A and B . Generally they are written as
A D A
A C B ;
and
B D B
A C B :
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In the Cournot duopoly the condition for maximization of A is as follows.
@A
@xA
.A C B/   A.@A@xA C
@B
@xA
/
.A C B/2 D 0:
Simplifying this equation under the assumption that A > 0 and B > 0 we have
@A
@xA
B   @B
@xA
A D 0:
Similarly the condition for maximization of B is as follows.
@B
@xB
A   @A
@xB
B D 0:
They are rewritten as
@A
@xA
  @B
@xA
A
B
D 0; (5)
and
@B
@xB
  @A
@xB
B
A
D 0: (6)
From the first order conditions in the Cournot duopoly of the difference case, when xA D QxdA
and xB D QxdB , we have
@A
@xA
D @B
@xA
D  bxB < 0;
and
@B
@xB
D @A
@xB
D  bxA < 0:
Since A > B at the equilibrium in the difference case, the left hand sides of (5) and (6) are
reduced to
@A
@xA

1   A
B
 
xADQxdA;xBDQxdB
> 0;
and
@B
@xB

1   B
A
 
xADQxdA;xBDQxdB
< 0:
Then, we get the following result.
Proposition 2. In asymmetric duopoly the equilibrium output at the Cournot equilibrium of the
more efficient (lower cost) firm in the ratio case is larger than that in the difference case, and the
equilibrium output at the Cournot equilibrium of the less efficient (higher cost) firm in the ratio
case is smaller than that in the difference case.
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In the Bertrand duopoly the conditions for maximization ofA andB under the assumption
that A > 0 and B > 0 are written as follows.
@A
@pA
B   @B
@pA
A D 0;
and
@B
@pB
A   @A
@pB
B D 0:
They are rewritten as
@A
@pA
  @B
@pA
A
B
D 0; (7)
and
@B
@pB
  @A
@pB
B
A
D 0: (8)
From the first order conditions in the Bertrand duopoly of the difference case, when pA D QpdA
and pB D QpdB , we have
@A
@pA
D @B
@pA
D b
1   b2 .pB   cB/ > 0;
and
@B
@pB
D @A
@pB
D b
1   b2 .pA   cA/ > 0:
Since A > B at the equilibrium in the difference case, the left hand sides of (7) and (8) are
reduced to
@A
@pA

1   A
B
 
pAD QpdA;pBD QpdB
< 0;
and
@B
@pB

1   B
A
 
pAD QpdA;pBD QpdB
> 0:
Then, we get the following result.
Proposition 3. In asymmetric duopoly the equilibrium price at the Bertrand equilibrium of the
more efficient (lower cost) firm in the ratio case is lower than that in the difference case, and the
equilibrium price at the Bertrand equilibrium of the less efficient (higher cost) firm in the ratio
case is lower than that in the difference case.
Also in the ratio case we can show the following result.
Proposition 4. In the ratio case the Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium are equiv-
alent.
Proof. See Appendix A.
We denote the equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B in the ratio case both at the Cournot
equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium by QxrA and QxrB , and denote the equilibrium prices of
the goods of Firm A and B by QprA and QprB . r denotes ratio.
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Explicit calculations Explicitly calculating the equilibrium outputs and prices, we obtain
QxrA D
.a   cA/.a   cB/.a   cA/   b.a   cB/
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 ;
QxrB D
.a   cA/.a   cB/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 ;
QprA D
.a   cA/f.1C b2/.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 ;
and
QprB D
.a   cB/f.1C b2/.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 :
From them
QxrA > QxdA and QxrB < QxdB ;
and
QprA < QpdA and QprB > QpdB
are derived. About details, see Appendix B.
Comparing the total output in the ratio case and that in the difference case yields
QxrA C QxrB   QxdA   QxdB D
b.a   cA/.a   cA/C .a   cB/.cB   cA/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
C b.a   cB/.a   cA/C .a   cB/.cA   cB/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
D .a   cA/C .a   cB/.cB   cA/
2
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g > 0:
Thus, the total output in the ratio case is larger than that in the difference case.
A note on the symmetric duopoly If the duopoly is symmetric, that is, cA D cB , in the
difference case and the ratio case, the equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B satisfy
QxdA D QxrA D QxdB D QxrB D
a   c
2
;
where c D cA D cB .
The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B satisfy
QpdA D QprA D QpdB D QprB D
.1   b/aC .1C b/c
2
:
Therefore, in symmetric duopoly maximization of relative profits in the difference case and max-
imization of relative profits in the ratio case are completely equivalent.
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5. Some discussions
5.1. Comparison of the difference case and the ratio case
Using a weight on the absolute profit of the rival firm, define the relative profit of each firm as
follows.
A D A   AB ; and B D B   BA;
with A > 0; B > 0 and AB D 1. Then, the first order conditions for maximization of A
and B in the Cournot duopoly are
@A
@xA
  A @B
@xA
D 0;
and
@B
@xB
  B @A
@xB
D 0:
Since @B
@xA
< 0 and @A
@xB
< 0, the larger the weight on the absolute profit of the rival firm, the
larger the absolute value of @A
@xA
or @B
@xB
. This means that a firm, whose weight on the absolute
profit of the rival firm is larger, is more aggressive, that is, produces larger output. The difference
case corresponds to a case where A D B D 1. On the other hand, the ratio case is equivalent
to a case where A D AB > 1 and B D BA < 1. Therefore, the more efficient firm (Firm A)
produces larger output, and the less efficient firm (Firm B) produces smaller output in the ratio
case than the difference case.
In the Bertrand duopoly we can show that the more efficient firm chooses the lower price, and
the less efficient firm chooses the higher price in the ratio case than the difference case because
@B
@pA
> 0 and @A
@pB
> 0. This means that the more efficient firm is more aggressive in the ratio
case also in the Bertrand duopoly.
5.2. Zero-sum game interpretation of the equivalence between Cournot
and Bertrand equilibria
The game of the difference case is a zero-sum game because
A CB D A   B C .B   A/ D 0:
In the game of the ratio case
A CB D A
A C B C
B
A C B D 1:
Thus, it is a constant-sum game. Of course, a constant-sum game is equivalent to a zero-sum
game.
Consider a two-person zero-sum game with two strategic variables as follows. There are two
players, A and B. They have two sets of strategic variables, (sA; sB/ and .tA; tB/. The relations
of them are represented by
sA D fA.tA; tB/; and sB D fB.tA; tB/:
10
fA and fB are differentiable. The payoff function of Player A is uA.sA; sB/ and the payoff
function of Player B is uB.sA; sB/ D  uA.sA; sB/. They are differentiable. The condition for
maximization of uA with respect to sA and the condition for maximization of uB with respect to
sB are
@uA
@sA
D 0; (9)
and
@uB
@sB
D 0: (10)
We assume the existence of the maximums of uA and uB . Substituting fA and fB into uA and
uB yields
uA D uA.fA.tA; tB/; fB.tA; tB//; uB D uB.fA.tA; tB/; fB.tA; tB//:
The condition for maximization of uA with respect to tA and the condition for maximization of
uB with respect to tB are
@uA
@sA
@fA
@tA
C @uA
@sB
@fB
@tA
D 0; (11)
and
@uB
@sA
@fA
@tB
C @uB
@sB
@fB
@tB
D 0: (12)
Under the assumption that @fA
@tA
@fB
@tB
  @fA
@tB
@fB
@tA
¤ 0, (11) and (12) are equivalent to (9) and (10).
Therefore, competition by .sA; sB/ and competition by .tA; tB/ are equivalent. If we regard fA
and fB as demand functions, sA and sB as outputs of firms, tA and tB as prices, we obtain the
equivalence of Cournot equilibrium and Bertrand equilibrium.
For example, consider the ratio case of relative profit maximization in duopoly. We regard sA
and sB as the outputs of the firms and denote them by xA and xB , also regard tA and tB as the
prices of the goods and denote them by pA and pB . We have
uA D .pA   cA/xA
.pA   cA/xA C .pB   cB/xB
D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA
.a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA C .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB ;
uB D .pB   cB/xB
.pA   cA/xA C .pB   cB/xB
D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB
.a   xA   bxB/xA   cAxA C .a   xB   bxA/xB   cBxB ;
fA.pA; pB/ D xA D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pA C bpB ;
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fB.pA; pB/ D xB D 1
1   b2 .1   b/a   pB C bpA;
@fA
@pA
D   1
1   b2 ;
@fB
@pA
D b
1   b2 ;
@fB
@pB
D   1
1   b2 ; and
@fA
@pB
D b
1   b2 : (13)
@fA
@pA
@fB
@pB
  @fA
@pB
@fB
@pA
¤ 0 is satisfied. (9) is reduced to
@uA
@xA
D .pA   cA   xA/.pB   cB/xB C bxAxB.pA   cA/
.A C B/2 D 0:
This is equivalent to (14) in Appendix A. Since
@uA
@xB
D  b.pB   cB/xAxB C .pA   cA/.pB   xB   cB/xA
.A C B/2 ;
using (13), we find that (11) means
  .pA   cA   xA/.pB   cB/xB C bxAxB.pA   cA/
  bb.pB   cB/xAxB C .pA   cA/.pB   xB   cB/xA D 0:
Arranging the terms we get
.1   b2/xA   .pA   cA/xB   bxA.pA   cA/ D 0:
This is the same as (16) in Appendix A, which is the condition for relative profit maximization
in the Bertrand duopoly of the ratio case.
Similarly we can show that (10) and (12) mean (15) and (17) in Appendix A.
The results of this paper, in particular, the relation between the difference case and the ratio
case seem to be extended to a case of general demand functions. It is a theme of future research.
Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 4
The conditions for maximization of A and B in the Cournot duopoly under the assumption
that A > 0 and B > 0 are
.pA   cA   xA/.pB   cB/C bxA.pA   cA/ D 0; (14)
and
.pB   cB   xB/.pA   cA/C bxB.pB   cB/ D 0: (15)
And the conditions for maximization of A and B in the Bertrand duopoly under the assump-
tion that A > 0 and B > 0 are
.1   b2/xA   .pA   cA/xB   bxA.pA   cA/ D 0 (16)
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and
.1   b2/xB   .pB   cB/xA   bxB.pB   cB/ D 0: (17)
From (14), (15) and the inverse demand functions we obtain
xB C bxA
xA C bxB D
pB   cB
pA   cA D
a   cB
a   cA ; (18)
or
pA   cA
xA C bxB D
pB   cB
xB C bxA ;
a   cA
xA C bxB D
a   cB
xB C bxA :
From (18) we get
xB
xA
D pB   cB   b.pA   cA/
pA   cA   b.pB   cB/ D
a   cB   b.a   cA/
a   cA   b.a   cB/ : (19)
Let
 D pA   cA
xA C bxB D
pB   cB
xB C bxA : (20)
Substituting this into (14) yields
.pA   cA   xA/.xB C bxA/C bxA.xA C bxB/ D 0: (21)
Assuming  ¤ 0, that is, pA   cA ¤ 0 and pB   cB ¤ 0, we get
.1   b2/xAxB   .pA   cA/.xB C bxA/ D 0:
This is the same as (16). Similarly substituting (20) into (15) we obtain (17). Alternatively,
substituting (21) into (16) and (17) we can get (14) and (15).
Therefore, even when the relative profit of a firm is defined as the ratio of the profit of that firm
to the total profit, the Cournot equilibrium and the Bertrand equilibrium are equivalent.
B. Calculations of the equilibrium outputs and prices in the
ratio case
(18) implies
xB C bxA D a   cB
a   cA .xA C bxB/:
Substituting this and the inverse demand functions into (21) under the assumption of  ¤ 0
yields
.a   2xA   bxB   cA/.a   cB/C bxA.a   cA/ D 0: (22)
(19) implies
xB D a   cB   b.a   cA/
a   cA   b.a   cB/xA:
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Substituting this into (22), the equilibrium output of Firm A in the ratio case is obtained as
follows.
QxrA D
.a   cA/.a   cB/.a   cA/   b.a   cB/
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 :
Similarly, the equilibrium output of Firm B in the ratio case is
QxrB D
.a   cA/.a   cB/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2
Comparing them with the equilibrium outputs of the firms in the difference case, we have
QxrA   QxdA D
b.a   cA/.a   cA/C .a   cB/.cB   cA/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
and
QxrB   QxdB D
b.a   cB/.a   cA/C .a   cB/.cA   cB/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
If cA < cB ,
QxrA > QxdA and QxrB < QxdB
hold.
From the inverse demand functions the equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B in the
ratio case are, respectively, derived as follows.
QprA D
.a   cA/f.1C b2/.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 ;
and
QprB D
.a   cB/f.1C b2/.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2
2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2 :
Comparing them with the equilibrium prices of the goods in the difference case, we have
QprA   QpdA D
b.a   cA/   b.a   cB/.2a   cA   cB/.cA   cB/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
and
QprB   QpdB D
b.a   cB/   b.a   cA/.2a   cA   cB/.cB   cA/
2f2.a   cA/.a   cB/   b.a   cA/2 C .a   cB/2g
If cA < cB ,
QprA < QpdA and QprB > QpdB
hold.
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